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Administrative reform was an ever-present feature of British government policy 
since 1979. This paper focuses on one aspect of the changes; introducing 
agencies. It has four sections. Section 2 briefly describes the context of 
agencification, outlining the comprehensive nature of British administrative 
reform and the reasons for change. Section 3 describes management and 
structural reform paying special attention to agencies. Section 4 discusses the 
problems arising from that policy before I provide an overall assessment which 




























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
Introduction1
The past fifteen years were a permanent revolution for the British civil service 
driven by the energy and commitment of the longest serving government this 
century. The government did not go away by losing either an election or its 
enthusiasm for reform. It displayed remarkable perseverance and Margaret 
Thatcher made no secret of her disdain bordering on outright hostility towards the 
civil service. Wright (1994, pp. 108-10) identifies five types of administrative 
reform in Western Europe: continuous adjustment; responses to specific political 
crises; pragmatic structural change; reform as its own cause; and comprehensive 
programmes. Although the British government is expert at inventing 
retrospective rationales for its administrative reforms, none the less the many and 
varied changes are linked by the consistent aims of pushing back the frontiers of 
the state and cutting public spending. So, as a starting-point, British 
administrative reform is distinct because it is comprehensive.
The Context of Changes.
The British government's programme can be broken down into seven broad parts:
• Introducing the minimalist state.
• Reasserting political authority.
• Improved monitoring and evaluation.
• Reforming public sector management.
• Reforming the structure.
• Democratising the public sector.
• Transforming the culture.
Briefly, British government sought to cut public expenditure and succeeded only 
in slowing the rate of increase. It cut the size of the civil service from 732,000 in 
1979 to 533,350 at 1 April 1994, although part of the fall stems from 
reclassifications, not cuts. The fundamental expenditure review announced in 
February 1993 will not deliver significant cuts in public expenditure but it will 
cut the number of senior civil servants further.





























































































The government asserted its political authority by curbing the civil service 
unions, and cash limiting public sector pay. It also personalised, some say 
politicised, the appointment of top civil servants, showing a marked preference 
for ’can do' civil servants. Commentators fear a loss of 'institutionalised 
scepticism' (Plowden, 1994, p. 104).
Britain multiplied regulatory bodies2 most notably for public utilities; revamped 
state audit bodies; increasingly employed management consultants for the '3Es' of 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; reformed the inspectorates to make them 
managerial; used performance indicators extensively, and strengthened Treasury 
control. We have witnessed 'the audit explosion' (Power, 1994).
I discuss the reform of public management and structure (agencies) in the next 
section.
It is grandiloquent to talk of democratising the public sector in one of the most 
secretive advanced industrial democracies but there have been some noteworthy 
reforms. The government introduced innovative equal opportunities programmes 
for women and ethnic minorities. There were also some minor but worthwhile 
improvements in open government, including improved access to information 
and publishing such constitutional documents as Questions of Procedure for 
Ministers.
The phrase ’transforming the culture' refers to the impact of managerialism on the 
Whitehall culture of a safe pair of hands, loyalty to the department and advising 
on policy. Some fear that managerialism, open competition for senior posts and 
employment contracts will erode the public service ethic. In response the 
government introduced a new civil service code of ethics covering the roles, 
duties and responsibilities of civil servants.
The pressures for change in Britain were common to Western Europe (see Wright 
1994, pp. 104-8). Six factors fuelled administrative reform.
• Economic depression and fiscal pressures leading to budget deficits.
• The 'New Right's' ideological distrust of 'big government' and 
accompanying determination to redraw the boundaries of the state.
• Europeanisation which further increased regulation and introduced 
new administrative pressures (for example, régionalisation).
2 In the UK the term 'agencies' refers to the executive agencies of central departments. It does 
not encompass regulatory bodies such as the new EU agencies. The topic of regulation and the 




























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
Public disenchantment with government performance which alleges 
that government does too much and what it does, doesn't work. 
International management fashions, especially the new public 
management (NPM).
Information technology which made it easier to introduce NPM.
But if these pressures are common, why was the pace of change in Britain greater 
than elsewhere in Western Europe? Three factors were of overriding importance.
First, a defining characteristic of British government is its strong executive and 
Margaret Thatcher used her position to push through reform of the civil service. 
The phrase 'political will' is commonly used to explain the government’s 
determination. 'Strong, directive, and above all persistent, executive leadership' is 
longer but more accurate.
Second, there are few constitutional constraints on that leadership, especially 
when the government has a large majority in parliament. Parliamentary 
sovereignty means that once the government decides on a change, it can use its 
parliamentary majority to pass legislation; there are no constitutional 
impediments. Also, central administrative reform in Britain does not require a 
statute, only the exercise of Crown Prerogative, or executive, powers.
Finally, the government evolved a clear ideological strategy to justify and 'sell' its 
various reform packages. It attacked big government and waste, used markets to 
create more individual choice and campaigned for the consumer. Under John 
Major, the rationale for reform became more elaborate. Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992) are the source of the phrase 'reinventing government' and they trumpet the 
era of 'entrepreneurial government'. British government cites their work to justify 
its policies (see, for example: Butler, 1993; Mottram, 1994; Waldegrave, 1993).3
Whatever the specific form of the rationale, one theme remains constant; to cut 
public spending. This imperative drove the search for management reform. 
Although a commonplace of the academic literature, it is worth stressing that 
administrative reform is always political. The Conservative government's 
determination to reform the civil service was rooted in the political decision to 
cut back government and its spending and to exert effective control over the 
administrative machine.
3 For a more detailed account of the changes see Rhodes, 1996: chapter 5. There is also an 





























































































So, this set of institutional, constitutional and political variables enabled the 
government to push its reforms through. The next section focuses on the 
management and structural reforms and I assess the changes and their problems 
in sections 4.
Management and Structural Reform
Waste was an anathema to the Thatcher government and stories abound about 
public sector profligacy; for example, experimental rats bred at £30 each when 
available commercially at £2 (see: Chapman, 1978; Hennessy, 1989). Such 
stories are often amusing but they are also important because they helped to fuel 
the drive to reform public management; commonly referred to as 'the new public 
management' (NPM). In Britain, NPM has two strands: managerialism; and the 
new institutional economics (Hood, 1991, p. 5).
Managerialism refers to introducing private sector management in the public 
sector. It stresses: hands-on, professional management; explicit standards and 
measures of performance; managing by results; value for money; and more 
recently closeness to the customer. The new institutional economics refers to 
introducing incentive structures (such as market competition) into public service 
provision. It stresses disaggregating bureaucracies; greater competition through 
contracting-out and quasi-markets; and consumer choice (for a more detailed 
discussion, see: Hood 1991; and Pollitt, 1993). Before 1988, managerialism was 
the dominant strand in Britain. After 1988, the ideas of the new institutional 
economics became a major source of innovation and of problems for managerial 
reforms.
Managerialism: Scrutinies to FMI
In May 1979, Margaret Thatcher appointed Sir Derek Rayner, managing director 
of Marks and Spencer to spearhead a drive for increased efficiency. The purposes 
of his efficiency scrutinies were 'action, not study’:
(a) to examine a specific policy, activity or function with a view to savings or increased 
effectiveness and to questioning all aspects of the work normally taken for granted; (b) 
to propose solutions to any problems identified and (c) to implement agreed solutions, or 
begin their implementation, within 12 months of the start of the scrutiny'. (The Scrutiny 
Programme: A Note of Guidance by Sir Derek Rayner. cited in Hennessy, 1989, p. 596.)
Estimates of the savings vary but Hennessy (1989, p. 598) suggests that, by 
December 1982 when Rayner returned to Marks & Spencer, 130 scrutinies saved 





























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
As 'Rayner's Raiders' scoured Whitehall for savings, they visited Michael 
Heseltine, Secretary of State at the Department of the Environment (DoE). 
Unusually for a minister, he was interested in management and redesigning the 
Whitehall machine. When he arrived at the DoE, he could not find out who was 
responsible for what and so, in 1979, he introduced a study of the information 
needs of ministers as a Rayner scrutiny. His management revolution was MINIS, 
or management information system for ministers, and it provides ministers with 
systematic information on the activities of the Department. He also used it to cut 
staff and measure effectiveness A second Rayner scrutiny, conducted by 
Christopher Joubert in 1981, divided the DoE into 120 cost centres. Each centre 
had an annual budget and an information system which told managers how they 
were doing. Enthusiastic about his new system, Michael Heseltine lectured 
Cabinet on the virtues of MINIS. The response was underwhelming, but he had 
the support of both the prime minister and the Treasury and the managerial 
revolution was not to be denied. The scrutinies mutated into the Efficiency Unit 
under Sir Robin Ibbs, and MINIS mutated into the Financial Management 
Initiative (FMI) via the Treasury and its preference for improved financial 
delegation and financial control over management information.
Launched in May 1982, FMI aimed:
to promote in each department an organisation and system in which managers at all 
levels have:
(a) a clear view of their objectives and means to assess and, wherever possible, measure 
outputs or performance in relation to those objectives;
(b) well-defined responsibility for making best use of their resources, including a critical 
scrutiny of output and value for money , and
(c) the information (particularly about costs), the training and the access to expert advice 
that they need to exercise their responsibilities effectively. (Cmnd 8616, 1982, para. 13)
Andrew Gray and his colleagues (1991, pp. 56-8) conclude that FMI 
institutionalised cost awareness in the civil service but its implementation was 
patchy because departments' tasks and contexts vary. Middle and lower 
management give the new system only qualified support because they have to 
marry their new 'freedom' to manage with centralised Treasury control. For its 
successful implementation, FMI needed strong political support but, in the 
forceful language of Sir Frank Cooper: 'I regard the minister-as-manager as 
nonsense. Ministers are not interested. It's not part of the ministerial stock-in- 
trade' (quoted in Hennessy, 1989, p. 609). Equally, FMI needed a strong lead 
from permanent secretaries who got to the top because of their policy, not their 





























































































depended on whether FMI was a useful means to political ends (for a more 
detailed assessment, see: Zifcak, 1994; and Gray and others, 1991).
The Efficiency Unit's (1988) report on the achievements of FMI, colloquially 
known as 'The Next Steps', confirmed this pessimistic assessment. Begun in 
Autumn 1986, completed in May 1987, but delayed until February 1988 because 
its conclusions were potentially embarrassing with a general election pending. 
The report concluded the managerial revolution was only skin-deep and 
recommended introducing agencies to carry out the executive functions of 
government and bring about real financial and managerial decentralisation. 
Agencies were a response to the failure of managerialism, heralding a new era in 
which the government sought to reinvent British public administration.
The New Institutional Economics
The second wave of administrative reform was more radical. Although the Fulton 
Report (Cmnd 3638, 1968) anticipated agencies with its proposals to 'hive-off 
blocs of work, the next wave of reform distinctively drew ideas from the new 
institutional economics. It stressed not only bureaucratic disaggregation (or 
agencification) but also competition and using market mechanisms (most notably, 
the purchaser-provider split and market testing); and improving the quality of 
services (especially through citizen's charters and responsiveness the consumers).
Agencification
The central idea of 'The Next Steps' is agencification or creating semi- 
autonomous agencies responsible for operational management. The key notion is 
'distance' from the central department so there is freedom to manage (Davies and 
Willman, 1991, p. 16). It is the classic doctrine in public administration of 
separating policy from administration. There is a general model. Each agency has 
a framework document which sets out its objectives and performance targets. The 
chief executive of the agency is not a permanent civil servant but on contract and 
most are appointed in an open competition. He or she is personally responsible to 
the minister for the agency's performance, but the minister remains accountable to 
parliament for policy. There is no blue-print. Agencies now cover a diverse group 
of organisations and increasingly they are developing their own ways of working.
Before setting up an agency four questions must be answered.
• Does the job need to be done at all (e.g. cuts)?




























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
• Does the government have to carry out the task itself (e.g. market 
testing)?
• Is the organisation properly structured and focused on the job to be 
done (e.g. agencification)?
Referred to as the 'Prior Options' test, these questions also mean that an existing 
agency can still be privatised (see: Cm 2627, p. 15; and Cabinet Office, 1994a, 
pp. 12 and 13) because agencies are reviewed every five years. Initially, agencies 
were an alternative to privatisation, not a step on the way (see: Margaret 
Thatcher's written answer in HC Deb. 24 October 1988, col. 14).
By April 1995, there were 109 agencies employing 67 per cent of the civil service 
(Cm 3164 1996, p. iii). The agencies are many and varied. A comprehensive 
description would be both long and tedious (see Cm 3164, 1996). Table 1 
illustrates this variety, distinguishing between welfare services, public services, 
regulatory, production, consultancy and leisure agencies. It draws further 
distinctions between those agencies which are self-funding and those still 
dependent on the Treasury; and those agencies which are monopolies and those 
facing competition.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Reform will continue, incrementally. The Treasury and Civil Service Committee 
(TCSC 1994, HC 27-1, para. 210-11) called for an extension of the agency 
approach to policy work and for auditing such work. The Government response 
was cautious. It remained 'positive' about applying Next Steps principles to policy 
work and it noted that departments already evaluate their policies. It made no 
proposals for change (Cm 2748, pp. 34-5). A speech by Deputy Prime Minister 
and First Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon Michael Heseltine, at the Civil Service 
College, 23 January 1996, on future administrative reform contained no major 
initiatives; he promised more of the same.
There are now two civil services; in the policy making core department and in the 
executive agencies (Cabinet Office, 1994, p. 7; TCSC, 1993, HC 390-1, pp. viii- 
ix). The British civil service was never unified, it always had federal qualities, 
but the distinction between policy and implementation becomes ever sharper and 
careers more distinct (Campbell and Wilson 1995: 300-301). Indeed, the Trosa 
Report commented that 'it was not sensible to continue with "two classes of 
people'" and recommended closing the 'cultural gap' between agencies and 
sponsoring departments.
There is some evidence the agencies are a success. Jenkins (1993, pp. 92-3) 





























































































organisational cultures and delivering 'real improvements in service delivery'. In 
a similar vein, Ian Colville and his colleagues (1993, p. 562) suggest 'outsiders .. 
underestimate the amount of change taking place', 'its effects ... took time to work 
through'. Greer's (1994, p. 133) study of agencies in social security concludes 
existing data has 'shortcomings’ but the outcome is 'promising'; for example, 
agencies achieve most of their targets.
Market Testing
The White Paper on Competing for Quality (Cm 1730, 1991) introduced 'market 
testing' or 'competition with outside suppliers to determine who is best able to 
provide a particular service on the basis of best long-term value for money'. In the 
early stages, market testing involves identifying blocks of work in agencies to put 
out to competitive tender. It is a way of comparing the costs of direct service 
provision by the agency with cost of provision by the private sectors. The White 
Paper set an ambitious target to review activities worth £1.5 billion in eighteen 
months ending in September 1993 and failed to meet it (for a detailed discussion 
see: Oughton, 1994; TCSC, 1994, Vol. II, pp. 159-64 and paras 1942-1987). 
More important, market testing conflicted with agencification; or in other words 
the new institutional economics conflicted with managerialism. Agency chief 
executives see it as the main problem:
the aim doesn't appear to be about achieving improved results, but more about marketing 
testing as much as possible and as quickly as possible, almost as an end in itself, without 
consideration for the future of the Agency (chief executive cited in Cabinet Office, 
1994a, p. 12).
Campbell and Wilson (1995: 243) reports that their respondents saw market 
testing as a 'betrayal of trust'. Staff now feel uncertain, threatened and 
unrewarded (Price Waterhouse, 1994, p. 3). The TCSC (HC 27-1, 1994, para. 
195) concluded the market testing programme 'had not been conducted 
effectively by the Government' and needed 'a reduction in the level of central 
oversight'. Above all, it reasserts central control, especially Treasury control. 
Competing for Quality was a Treasury document and Jordan (1994, p. 32) 
concludes: 'If there is a turf battle going on between defenders of the agency 
approach and market testers, the tide of the battle appears in favour of the latter'.
Citizen's Charter
The White Paper on The Citizen's Charter (Cm 1599, 1991) was prime minister 
John Major’s 'Big Idea'. The key objectives were to improve the quality of public 
services and provide better value for money. The Citizen's Charter contains six 
principles: published explicit standards; full and accurate information about 




























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
effective remedies; and efficient and economical delivery of services, many of 
which have been revised with higher standards (Cm 2540, 1994). Sir Robin 
Butler (1993, p. 402) describes the Citizen's Charter as 'the culmination of the 
movement to output measurement'. Consumer interests now dominate producer 
interests: 'people power'. It is a little early for such an assessment. Christopher 
Pollitt (1993, p. 187) is nearer the mark when he concludes that 'it is not so much 
a charter for citizen empowerment as managerialism with a human face' (and for 
another, early evaluation see: Doem, 1993).
Managerialism gave us '3Es'. The new institutional economics provides the 
intellectual rationale for a new unholy trinity: agencies, contracts and charters. 
Added together, they make a dramatic agenda for change in the British 
administrative landscape. But the three initiatives pull in different directions and 
Next Steps confronts some important problems.
Problems
It is too early to evaluate the success or failure of agencies with any certainty. 
Inevitably, this section is speculative, although I draw on the available evidence 
whenever possible. Undoubtedly, the government's reforms have the potential for 
far-reaching change in the civil service. This section discusses the extent and 
effects of those changes under the headings of: fragmentation; steering; 
accountability; disasters; and culture.
Fragmentation
The most obvious result of the new system is institutional fragmentation. Service 
delivery depends on linking organisations. Policy implementation becomes more 
difficult because policy has to be negotiated with more and more organisations 
(see, for example: Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Organisational interdependence is 
common and the government faces the increasingly difficult task of steering 
interorganisational networks (Rhodes, 1996, chapter 3). The Swedish experience 
with agencies suggests fragmentation breeds independence. Fudge and 
Gustafsson (1989, p. 33) describe how Swedish agencies develop different 
cultures to the centre, leading to problems of communication, and reluctance by 
agencies to accept central guidelines.
Steering
Jenkins (1993, p. 94) argues the government did not strengthen strategic capacity 
with the other changes. Agencies work in a 'policy vacuum' and steering is 





























































































differentiated institutional systems is to develop the capacity for steering and 
consensus. Thus, in Sweden, Fudge and Gustaffson (1989, p. 33) describe a lack 
of co-ordination, and confusion of roles, between central ministry and agency. 
Given that the 'Next Steps' agencies will develop a near monopoly of expertise in 
their policy area, given that policy often emerges from many small decisions, it is 
conceivable the agency tail will wag the departmental dog. British central 
departments experiment with strategic planning to counter this erosion of central 
capability. Sir Robin Butler (1993, p. 404) echoes these same concerns when he 
writes:
it is essential that it does not reach the point where individual Departments and their 
Agencies become simply different unconnected elements in the overall public sector, 
with ... no real working mechanisms for policy co-ordination' (emphasis added).
The view from the agencies is different. They are less concerned about horizontal 
links between departments and more with their links to the core department. 
From the start, chief executives complained about central control and the lack of 
clarity over responsibility for decisions (Price Waterhouse, 1991). It remains 
unclear whether the sponsoring department imposes the framework agreement or 
it is a product of genuine negotiation. Both the Frazer and Trosa reports noted 
'considerable frustration' over detailed interference in management both from the 
sponsoring departments and central departments, especially the Treasury (Cabinet 
Office, 1991, p. 20; and 1994a, p. 29; TCSC, 1994, HC 27-1 paras 157-62). 
Agency chief executives still claim they have to be on their guard against 
departmental interference (Price Waterhouse, 1994, p. 8; see also: Massey, 1995, 
pp. 8-9). The brute fact is that 'I am a civil servant and cannot say no' (chief 
executive cited in Cabinet Office 1994a, p. 31). The sponsoring departments have 
not adapted to the new situation and still exercise too much detailed control over 
finance and personnel (Cabinet Office, 1994a, pp. 32, 34 and 42).
Disasters
According to Hood and Jackson (1991, pp. 16-24), the 'government's capacity to 
manufacture social disasters has increased greatly'. For example, they argue that 
NPM breaks up government organisations into separate units, creating barriers to 
communication between the units and incentives to distort and conceal 
information. The hands-off approach to business and relaxing regulations 
encourages lax enforcement and capture of the regulators. Employing executives 
on contract leads to a loss of bureaucratic experience. In sum, NPM contains the 
'organisational ingredients' associated with 'socially created disasters'. The Public 
Accounts Committee (1994) provides numerous examples. For example, The 
Property Services Agency was supposed to invoice all departments for the work it 




























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
million. The Wessex Regional Health Authority wasted at least £20 million on a 
regional information system. They also used a seconded IBM employee to advise 
them on the purchase of an IBM computer, without competition, and it cost £0.5- 
1.0 million more than it should have done. Hood and Jackson (1991) conclude 
that 'NPM could be a disaster waiting to happen'.
Accountability
Fragmentation erodes accountability because sheer institutional complexity 
obscures who is accountable to whom for what. The government confuses 
consumer responsiveness with political accountability. Responsive service 
delivery as envisaged by such innovations as The Citizen's Charter (Cm 1599) 
and the associated Code of Practice on Access to Government Information are 
welcome but they supplement, not replace, political accountability because the 
consumer has no powers to hold a government agency to account. This 
accountability 'gap' became wider with the advent of agencies because no new 
arrangements were introduced to preserve the constitutional convention of 
ministerial responsibility.
Waldegrave (1993, p. 20) tried to justify this inaction by drawing a distinction 
between 'responsibility, which can be delegated, and accountability, which 
remains firmly with the minister'.4 On this view, agencies and the other reforms 
clarified responsibility but left 'the Minister properly accountable for the policies 
he settles'. In short, British government has undergone a significant decrease in 
political accountability, and the damage is compounded by the government's 
refusal to recognise there is a problem.
Most attention focuses on the constitutional convention of individual ministerial 
responsibility which states that ministers are accountable to parliament for all the 
actions of their department. To keep ministerial responsibility intact, the 
government distinguishes between policy and management. Responsibility (for 
management) can be delegated to agency chief executives. Accountability (for 
policy) remains with the minister. But this distinction hinges on clear definitions 
of both policy and management and of the respective roles and responsibilities of 
ministers, senior civil servants and chief executives. They do not exist:
the appropriate accountability arrangements are not obvious because it is not always
possible to clearly separate policy and management issues and some chief executives,
4 See also: the Cabinet Office memorandum to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 
1994, Vol. II pp. 188-191 which takes casuistic circumlocution to impenetrable lengths. Truly, 





























































































especially the ones from the private sector, are very conscious of being in what they 
consider to be a fairly precarious position. (Cabinet Office, 1994a, p. 24)
The government argues the reforms introduce greater 'transparency' in 
government without undermining the key constitutional principle of ministerial 
accountability (Cm. 2627, p. 16; and Massey, 1995, p. 25). The TCSC (1994, HC 
27-1, para. 132) rejected the government's distinction between responsibility and 
accountability, noting the division of responsibilities was often unclear. Other 
critics are more pungent rejecting the government's views as 'superficial and 
complacent' (Plowden, 1984, p. 127; see also Davies and Willman, 1991, pp. 24- 
32; and Stewart's, 1993 critique of Waldegrave, 1993). As Jordan (1992, p. 13) 
points out 'There is a deliberate or accidental ambiguity' between 'accountability 
to the Minister by the chief executive' and 'accountability of the Minister to the 
House of Commons'. (See also: Greer, 1994, chapter 6; and Bogdanor, 1993).
The ambiguity matters. In theory, chief executives are responsible for policy 
implementation but '80 per cen t... claim to have a policy input - despite the 'Next 
Steps' emphasis on their role of delivering a service rather than policy 
formulation' (Price Waterhouse, 1994, pp. 7-8). 'The chief executive of the Prison 
Service is the government's principal adviser on prisons policy' (Plowden, 1994, 
p. 128). The current arrangement allows the minister to take the credit when the 
policy goes well but to blame the chief executive when things go wrong; 'the 
separation of policy and management is advantageous to those on the policy side, 
and disadvantageous to managers' (Davies and Willman, 1991, p. 34). There is no 
shortage of examples. The unpopularity of the government's policy of absent 
father's paying child support is part of any explanation of Ros Hepplewhite's 
resignation as chief executive of the Child Support Agency. The Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, sacked Derek Lewis, chief executive of the Prison Service, who 
complained bitterly the Home Secretary 'invented a new definition of the word 
"operational" which meant "difficult"'. He commented that Howard’s attempt to 
'use the distinction between policy and operation was no more than a political fig 
leaf which was so small as to be grossly indecent' (cited in Barker 1996:19). He 
sued for wrongful dismissal. The Home Office paid contractual compensation but 
did not admit Lewis was wrongfully dismissed. In sum, there is no clear dividing 
line between policy and operations, undermining ministerial accountability to 
parliament by helping ministers avoid blame.
Parliament has not seized the opportunities created by Next Steps to improve its 
scrutiny of government departments. Giddings (1995, p. 226) argues 
parliamentary scrutiny of Next Steps was 'at best fragmentary and episodic'. 
There is a radical interpretation of Next Steps which foresees direct links between 
parliament and agencies. The chief executive of an agency is often, but not 




























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
of parliament to answer questions within the Osmotherly rules which confine 
civil servants and chief executives to questions of fact, ruling out any discussion 
of the merits of policy or advice given to ministers (Civil Service Department, 
1980). Unfortunately, these innovations' do not add up to a direct accountability 
link between agencies and parliament. Pyper (1995, p.30) suggests that in ten 
years we may have either an 'accountability gap 'which eases 'buck passing' or a 
'crab-like step' towards improved accountability. Now we have incremental 
change in an unknown direction!
Administrative culture
Managerialism and the '3Es' are a challenge to the culture of Whitehall. The ’3Cs' 
is a shorthand way of referring to the erosion of traditional civil service values. It 
refers to: conduct; code of ethics; and culture.
Sexual and financial scandals involving ministers are great fun but perhaps less 
important than other forms of conduct; for example, ministers misleading 
parliament (Ponting, 1985); using civil servants for 'inappropriate' party political 
work (Plowden, 1994, p. 109); waste of public money (Public Accounts 
Committee, 1994, Annex 2); declining standards in public life (Cm 2850 1995) 
and abuse of power (Scott, 1996). So, interest in a code of ethics grew. The TCSC 
(1994, para. 101-7 and pp. cxxvi-cxxvii) proposed such a code with an 
independent appeal to the Civil Service Commissioners (para. 108-12). The 
government responded promptly with a code (Cm 2748, 1995, pp. 5-6 and Annex 
pp. 43-5). The Nolan Committee (Cm 2850 1995) sought to toughen the proposed 
code by, for example, protecting the civil service from politicisation. The 
government accepted its proposals.
Of most concern here is the civil service culture which blends such values as 
honesty, loyalty, impartiality, propriety and a respect for intelligence with 
conservatism, scepticism, elitism and arrogance (see: Butler, 1993, p. 8; and 
Plowden, 1994, pp. 21-3 and 74). Managerialism, open competition, impropriety 
and macho-ministers add up to a dilution of this culture or ethos. The skills of the 
civil service have also been downgraded for those of business management.
Specific event dramatise these fears. In the summer of 1992, Sir Peter Kemp was 
'retired' as project manager of Next Steps by the new Minister of Public Service 
and Science, William Waldegrave. In spring 1993. Mr Derek Lewis became the 
chief executive of the new agency for the Prison Service. His appointment was 
controversial because he was not a civil servant nor the first choice of the 
selectors who preferred the serving civil servant. The (then) Home Secretary, 
Kenneth Clarke, chose Mr Lewis because of his support for competition and 





























































































illustrate the possible 'end' of the permanent, career civil servant but it is too early 
to read the rites over the senior civil service. The Oughton Report's (Efficiency 
Unit, 1993, p. 108) survey of civil servants reports there is 'a belief the public 
service ethos is being eroded'. Wilson (1991, p. 335) reports only 16 per cent of 
his sample of civil servants mentioning 'articulating long-term interests' among 
their sources of job satisfaction. The Association of First Division Civil Servants 
(FDA) focuses on protecting its members from ministers and has dropped its 
concern with the public interest (Plowden, 1994, p. 117). MORI polled 1900 
FDA members about work and change in the civil service (response rate 54%). 
The survey reported a high level of dissatisfaction. More than 80% of 
respondents thought that reform was badly managed and undermining unity of 
the civil service. 85% wanted a code of ethics. (For full details of the survey see: 
British Public Opinion. August, 1995, pp. 3-4.) Others are more sceptical about 
the erosion of the public service ethos; for example, Sir Peter Kemp doubts this 
revolution has reached the senior civil service (Kemp, 1994; Greenaway, 1995). 
The 'glue' still holds (see the quotations from senior civil servants in Plowden 
1994, p. 71). Departments are 'still managed by people who got there because of 
their policy skills rather than their management skills’ (Watson, 1992, p. 27). The 
litmus test will be the response to the White Paper, The Civil Service: Continuity 
and Change (Cm 2627, 1994), especially its proposals for open competition and 
written employment contracts for the senior civil service. Many commentators 
hedge their bets and suggest the jury is still out (see, for example: Jenkins, 1993).
Conclusions: Assessing Change
For many commentators, managerialism and agencies have had a significant 
impact on the public service culture of the civil service but it is easy to 
exaggerate the degree to which British government has changed and now works 
along similar lines to private business. For example, Wright (1994, p. 123) argues 
the state, compared with the early 1980s 'is becoming': more defined; more 
diminished; more decremental; more divided; more disaggregated; more distant; 
more deregulated; more denationalised; more defensive and demoralised; and 
more disoriented; but then warns against exaggeration! Conversely, Sue Richards 
notes how much has not changed, itemising: 'fast stream' recruitment; ministerial 
accountability; the permanent secretary as sole accounting officer; the policy 
function; senior appointment procedures; and the delegation of pay and 
conditions of work to agencies (TCSC, 1993, HC 390-II, p. 278). It may be a 
cliché but it remains essential to distinguish carefully between the rhetoric and 




























































































Agencies in British Government: Revolution or Evolution?
So, British government is trying to reinvent itself but is its revolution 
transforming the centre? There are two possible answers. First, we have been here 
before. Thus, William Robson's (1962, Ch. 6 and pp. xvi-xviii) discussion of 
public ownership identifies the twilight zone' between government power and 
managerial freedom in which Ministers exercise private influence and reach 
'informal understandings' as a key problem. One conclusion is, therefore, that 
Next Steps simply reinvents the relationship between the sponsoring ministry and 
its nationalised industries. It never proved possible to identify a limit to 
ministerial influence or to draw a clear line between the responsibilities of 
minister and the industry's Board. The relationship remained bedevilled by a fatal 
ambiguity. For agencies this fate remains possible.
The second answer accepts the government has embarked on an exciting 
experiment to create different ways of delivering services. However, a policy 
experiment needs systematic learning: that is, it must produce information so the 
policy makers can identify and correct errors. The current programme of reform 
is not so designed. Also, change follows change with such speed that systematic 
assessment is impossible. This design fault is important, given the problems 
already identified. Contingency theory tells us there is no one best way to design 
organisational structure; it depends on the fit between organisation and 
environment. So the agency model will not fit all organisations; for example, 
'agencies' in a politicised environment (social security) will have a different 
organisational structure and pattern of managerial behaviour to 'agencies' with 
routinised tasks and stable environments (vehicle licensing). So, some agencies 
will fail. Evaluation could tell us which ones and why. It is unlikely 
organisational design can be reduced to the agency formula. Fittingly, Sir Robin 
Butler described the reforms as a journey to an unknown destination (Butler, 
1993, p. 406). How then will the government change its course in response to the 
problems thrown up by reinventing government? What will British government 
look like a decade from today?
At the heart of any future policy evaluation is the relationship between 
sponsoring and central departments and agencies. The core assumption of the 
experiment is 'distance'; separating policy and management.5 It is possible 
'distance' could characterise the relationship between department and agency. 
Agencies could become independent as in the Swedish case. However, it is 
currently more plausible to suggest the sponsoring departments have not
5 I use the term 'distance' deliberately. The term decentralisation' refers to the transfer of power 
to lower levels within a bureaucratic or territorial hierarchy (see, Rhodes, 1992, pp. 317-19). For 
UK agencies the question of whether there is a transfer of power remains unclear and should be 





























































































adapted to their new strategic role and, instead, duplicate agency functions. The 
oversight of central departments remains detailed. Agency chief executives 
provide policy advice. There is evidence supporting this limited change version 
of events. Even commentators who stress the achievements of Next Steps want 
to give the agencies more independence (Massey, 1995, pp. 12-13). However, 
existing studies relied either on questionnaires or on semi-structured elite 
interviews. There are no case studies of the dynamics of the relationship. We 
know nothing about the informal understandings and the indirect influence 
which so characterised relationships with nationalised industries, although some 
witnesses to the TCSC (1993, HC 390-11, para. 800) already talk of a 
'complicity' between the two. At best, Next Steps is an 'evolutionary revolution' 
(Greer, 1994, p. 132) and many commentators echo this assessment. Perhaps 
more important, Jenkins (1993, p. 95) suggests that recent reforms reflect an 
enduring conflict between the old politics of central control and a new model of 
management promoting entrepreneurial behaviour.
The government pushed through its reforms with opposition restricted to the 
professional-bureaucratic policy networks and focused on policy implementation. 
All governments suffer from both 'implementation gaps’ and 'unintended 
consequences' (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, pp. 182-6; Rhodes, 1996, chapters 1 
and 3) and the Conservative government's reforms of the civil service were no 
exception. Incremental change continues to typify British administrative reform. 
These reforms have the potential to transform the British centre, but that potential 
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